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ROOM IN THE KITCHEN FOR THE MELTING POT:
IMMIGRATION AND RENTAL PRICES
Albert Saiz*
Abstract—This paper studies the response of housing markets to immigration shocks. Following Card (1990), I examine the changes in rental
prices in Miami and three comparison groups after the Mariel boatlift.
This exogenous immigration shock added an extra 9% to Miami’s renter
population in 1980. I find that rents increased from 8% to 11% more in
Miami than in the comparison groups between 1979 and 1981. By 1983
the rent differential was still 7%. Rental units of higher quality were not
affected by the immigration shock. Units occupied by low-income Hispanic residents in 1979 experienced an extra 8% differential hike with
respect to other low-income units. Relative housing prices moved in the
opposite direction from rents in the short run.

I.

Introduction

T

HE economics literature on the impact of immigration
has focused on its implications for the labor market.
But much less is known about its effect on local prices. This
paper considers the impact of immigration on housing
markets: does it change rents and home values and thus
affect the real wages and wealth of previous residents?
Immigration in the United States and other industrialized
countries boosts housing demand, especially for rental units.
In the United States the number of new immigrant households moving into rental units was greater than the full
increase in the number of rentals between 1996 and 1999.
This implies that immigrant households accounted for all
new demand in this period. In the northeast and western
regions, the foreign-born represented 28% of renter households in 1999, up from 15% percent in 1980.1
This paper provides evidence of the short-run effect of
immigration on rental markets. It finds a positive correlation
between immigration inflows in U.S. metropolitan areas and
changes in rents for rental units of moderate quality. This
result holds controlling for changes in income, changes in
population, and a proxy for expectations of future growth.
To address concerns over the endogeneity of immigration
inflows, and following the approach in Card (1990), I make
Received for publication March 19, 2001. Revision accepted for publication May 20, 2002.
* Department of Economics, Harvard University; Federal Reserve Bank
of Philadelphia.
This paper is based on Chapter 1 of my dissertation (Saiz, 2002) and
does not necessarily represent the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia or the Federal Reserve System. Thanks to Christopher
Jencks, David Cutler, and Ed Glaeser for comments and support. George
Akerloff, George Borjas, two anonymous referees, Diego Comı́n, Katherine Newman, Emmanuel Saez, Tara Watson, and participants at the
Harvard Labor Economics Workshop and the Harvard Kennedy School
Inequality Proseminar provided helpful comments and suggestions. They
could not help the remaining errors, which are attributable only to the
author. The author acknowledges funding from the Graduate Program in
Inequality and Social Policy (Harvard Kennedy School) and the Lincoln
Institute of Land Policy. Months after the submission of this paper to the
RESTAT, I learned about independent work in progress on the impact of
the Mariel boatlift on rents by Scott Susin. It is reassuring that we found
similar results working independently.
1 These figures are from Joint Center for Housing Studies (2000).

use of the Mariel boatlift in the Miami metropolitan area. I
document a sharp increase in local rental prices associated
with this immigration shock. The immigrants from Mariel
increased the renter population of Miami by at least 9% in
one year (1980). From 1979 to 1981 rents increased in real
terms by 8% to 11% percent more in Miami than in three
groups of comparison metropolitan areas. This difference
had fallen somewhat by 1983, but was still about 7%. The
immigration shock, consisting mainly of unskilled Cuban
nationals, seems to have had an even greater impact on
housing units occupied in 1979 by poor Hispanic residents.
The results are important for understanding the short-run
and medium-run local response of natives to substantial
localized immigration. One of the main motivations of the
literature on immigration and labor market outcomes is to
examine the distributive impact of immigration. Most area
studies find that immigration of workers with a certain skill
level has little or no effect on the absolute and relative
wages of the local population with similar skill levels
(Altonji & Card, 1991). Card (1990) used the Mariel boatlift
as a quasi experiment to identify the impact of immigrants
on wages and did not find any effect, even in the short run.
At the same time, native workers seem to avoid and migrate
out from areas with high levels of immigration (Filer, 1992).
This suggests that the mobility of natives may counterbalance the theoretical short-run effects of immigration on
local wages.2 But the fact that immigration shocks are
quickly arbitraged away is itself surprising. If wages do not
adjust in the short run, what motivates native workers to
avoid the areas where immigrants concentrate? Workers
take longer to react to other shocks in local labor markets
(Blanchard & Katz, 1992), and local wages seem to be
responsive to labor market shocks in the short run (Topel,
1986). These observations prompt Borjas (1994) to argue
that the main empirical puzzle arising from this literature is:
“Why should it be that many other regional variations
persist over time, but the impact of immigration on native
workers is arbitraged away immediately?”
This problem suggests that we need to look at other
markets and social interactions to understand the local
impact and responses to immigration. Several studies have
documented the existence of competition between lowincome immigrants and previous low-income residents for a
variety of goods that are fixed in the short run.3 Housing is
2 Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1996) argue that the effects of immigration
on local labor markets are spread out into the national labor market. These
authors rely on a structural approach to find moderate effects of immigration on wages.
3 For example, Borjas and Hilton (1996) and Hansen and Lofstrom
(2000) examine the use of welfare benefits by immigrants in the United
States and Sweden. Simon (1999, chapter 9) discusses the impact on
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the most important of such goods. To explain changes in the
welfare and moving decisions of natives, both wages and
rents have to be taken into account within an economic
spatial equilibrium (Roback, 1982).
Consider the case of relatively unskilled immigrants.
Existing literature (Borjas, 1994, 2000; National Research
Council, 1997) argues that the average educational attainment of recent immigrants in the United States is below that
of natives. Because of their relatively low earnings during
their initial years in the host country, unskilled immigrants
are disproportionately likely to demand lower-cost—and
hence lower-quality—housing. The housing units that recent immigrants demand are usually rental apartments. The
short-run supply of low-quality rentals is bound to be more
inelastic than the overall housing supply. Thus, in a segmented housing market with different qualities (Sweeny,
1974; Braid, 1981; O’Flaherty, 1996), the effects of unskilled immigration in the short run may be stronger for
low-quality units.
The fact that different quality segments of the housing
markets may be differently affected by immigration is
important. In the very short run, a low-skilled immigration
shock is unlikely to change substantially the local demand
for housing units of higher quality. Therefore, if one is
interested in the real consumption wage of unskilled workers, it is important to look at changes in the costs of
dwellings of moderate quality (usually rental units), rather
than simply examine changes in overall local price indices
or changes in average housing costs.
Empirically, I find that the overall average impact of the
boatlift on real wages through changes in rents was modest,
even in the short run: a reduction of 1.42%. Nevertheless, as
noted before, this impact was more important for households in the lower quartile of the renters’ income distribution: 3.77%.
The effects of immigration on housing markets can actually be better identified than the effects on labor markets.
After all, it is not clear what is the counterfactual of
immigration in the national labor market: international trade
flows and domestic production are very much endogenous
to the level of immigrant labor. Physical presence is the only
indisputable characteristic of the immigrant labor input and
has direct effects on housing markets, the spatial organization of neighborhoods, and social interactions (Zax, 1998;
Jones-Correa, 2000). Thus, irrespective of the wage impact
of immigration on previous residents, the interplay between
immigrants and residential markets is a topic of considerable importance.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents a
simple model that applies the idea of spatial equilibrium to
the impact of immigration on rents in a segmented housing
market. Section III describes the data sets that I use for the
empirical analysis. Section IV presents some general evinatural resources and the environment. Hoxby (1998) analyzes the impact
on admissions of native minorities to top colleges.
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dence about the correlation of immigrant inflows and rents
and defines my empirical strategy. Section V describes the
short-run changes in rental prices, the housing stock supply
adjustment, and the changes in residential density during the
years after the Mariel boatlift. I also describe the mediumrun adjustment after the boatlift. Section VI concludes the
paper and discusses avenues for further research.
II.

A Model

In this section I present a simplified model that helps to
understand the effects of an immigration shock on the
housing market. I focus on shocks that consist of unskilled
individuals. The model uses the fact that housing units have
different quality levels (Sweeny, 1974). As in Braid (1981),
I use a bid-rent approach to examine the demand for quality
by different income groups. I simplify Braid’s (1981) approach by considering only two income groups and by using
a quasi-linear utility function separable in income and tastes
for housing quality. My focus is on simple predictions of
empirical content, in a framework of segmented housing
markets, different income groups, and mobility.
The model assumes that there are two types of individuals: type U individuals, who possess fewer labor market
skills4 and generally earn lower wages, and the more skilled
type S individuals. Individuals are identical within a type.
Both types of individuals decide whether to locate in city M
or elsewhere in the country. If unskilled individuals decide
U
to move into M, they receive a wage W M
that is a function
of the measure of unskilled individuals in the city (N U ),
U
with dW M
(N U )/dN U ⬍ 0. Skilled individuals receive a
S
fixed wage W M
(including skill-specific amenities) if they
move into the city.5
Once they move into M, both unskilled and skilled
individuals occupy a single dwelling. This implies that total
population is equal to the housing supply. There is a continuum of dwelling qualities (Q). There is a short-run
supply of housing units of each quality. The supply function
 ]; P(Q) is
is represented by S( p(Q), Q), with support [0, Q
the rent paid for a dwelling of quality Q. Tastes for quality
differ between skilled and unskilled persons and can be
represented by an increasing and strictly concave function
V n (Q) for n ⫽ U, S. I normalize so that V n (0) ⫽ 0. I
assume that dV S (Q)/dQ ⬎ dV U (Q)/dQ @Q, so skilled
persons are always willing to pay more for a dwelling of the
same quality. The utility function for both skilled and
4 The skill assignment process is exogenous to this analysis. Productive
skills are understood in a comprehensive sense and include cognitive
skills, education, training, experience, cultural knowledge, language, linguistic registers, social skills, social networks, and any other form of
specific and general human capital. Many recent immigrants will start in
their new countries with relatively low levels of such skills even if their
formal academic qualifications are high. See Weiss (2000) for an account
of the experiences of highly educated Russian immigrants in Israel.
5 Topel (1986) finds that “consistent with the greater geographic mobility of more educated workers, their wages are less sensitive to both current
and future changes in relative local employment.”
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unskilled is quasi-linear and separable in dwelling quality
and a numeraire good. Both types of individuals enjoy a
general amenity premium of A M for living in location M.
Assuming that any prospective immigration shock is completely unexpected, the spatial equilibrium before the immigration shock for the unskilled individuals implies that
V U 共Q兲 ⫹ A M ⫹ W UM 共N U 兲 ⫺ P共Q兲 ⫽ U U

FIGURE 1.—EQUILIBRIUM

IN THE

HOUSING MARKET

(1)

for all Q (where U U is equal to the utility level an unskilled
worker can attain elsewhere in the country). Let N *U be the
number of unskilled individuals residing in M in equilibrium.
From (1) I obtain the unskilled individuals’ bid rents for
quality ( U ) and, similarly, for skilled individuals ( S ):6
 U 共Q兲 ⫽ V U 共Q兲 ⫹ A M ⫹ W UM 共N *U 兲 ⫺ U U ,

(2)

 S 共Q兲 ⫽ V S 共Q兲 ⫹ A M ⫹ W SM ⫺ U S .

(3)

The cutoff quality level that separates the qualities occupied by unskilled and skilled individuals is Q*. This magnitude corresponds to the intersection of the two groups’ bid
rents, where
V S 共Q*兲 ⫹ A M ⫹ W SM ⫺ U S
⫽ VU 共Q*兲 ⫹ AM ⫹ WUM 共N*U 兲 ⫺ UU .

(4)

For qualities below Q* the market rent of the dwelling is
determined by the unskilled bid-rent curve. For qualities
above Q* rents are determined by the skilled bid-rent curve.
Formally,

再

U
P共Q兲 ⫽ S

if
if

Q ⱕ Q*,
Q ⬎ Q*.

Thus, rents reflect both the specific advantages of the city
and the competition between and within the groups for
better locations. The model produces a segmented housing
market. Each skill level occupies a different portion of the
quality continuum.
Equation (4) and the housing market clearing condition
(5) determine the measure of unskilled persons living at M
and the quality cutoff point7
N *U ⫽

冕

Q*

S共 U 共Q兲, Q兲 dQ.

(5)

0

This spatial equilibrium is portrayed in figure 1. The rent
gradient corresponds to the highest bid rent at each quality.
6 Notice that the bid rents and the final equilibrium prices of the
dwellings capitalize the value of the local advantages in M. This is
essential to the analysis.
7 The number of skilled individuals in equilibrium can be obtained from
the housing supply for those qualities above Q*. Notice how the prices
within this range are determined by the exogenous parameters.

The figure shows the bid rents for quality for the unskilled and the skilled group [⌿ U (Q) and ⌿ S (Q)
respectively]. The actual market rent corresponds to the highest bid rent at any given quality level: the
envelope of the two bid rents (thicker line in the figure). Quality Q* separates the housing units occupied
by the unskilled and skilled workers.

The nature of the equilibrium is determined by the advantage of the city for the skilled persons.8
Now, assume that an unpredicted immigration shock of
immigrants with measure N I arrives in M (with N I ⬍ N *U ).
Assume that all of the immigrants are unskilled and have the
same utility function as local unskilled individuals, but with
the addition of a premium specific to M, namely A I,M . 9 The
short run will be characterized by moving costs that are
arbitrarily high for the previous native city dwellers (Borjas,
2001). Thus, the new total measure of unskilled persons in
the city is N I ⫹ N *U . The number of skilled persons does not
change. The slopes of the bid curves for both groups are
determined by the preferences for quality and do not change
because of the shock. Thus, the new equilibrium bid-rent
curves can be characterized by adding a constant to the old
ones (see Appendix A). Let C U and C S be these constants for
the unskilled and skilled groups, respectively. Let Q** be
the new quality cutoff point that separates the skilled from
the unskilled after the immigration shock.
Proposition 1 C U ⬎ C S ⬎ 0. In the short run, the
increase in the rent paid by unskilled individuals is greater
than the increase in the rent paid by skilled individuals.
8 In Appendix 1 I provide some comparative statics of the model.
Concretely, an increase in W MS increases all housing rents and the supply
of housing and population while reducing the quality cutoff point Q*.
9 This premium arises because city M is used as a focal point to
coordinate immigrants: they can invest in specific ethnic local public
goods, and they value the proximity of individuals of the same national
group. The premium is necessary in the model if we assume that immigrants have a preference for the city and do not spread all over the rest of
the urban system.
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Proposition 2 Q** ⬎ Q*. In the short run, the quality
cutoff point rises as a result of the shock: unskilled persons
displace skilled ones from dwellings that are in the neighborhood of Q*.
The proofs are given in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 is the main result of the model. If the
housing market is segmented, an unskilled immigration
shock has a greater impact on the rents paid by unskilled
persons in the short run. This result holds even if the
housing stock is formed by a continuum of qualities and
persons can move upscale to avoid crowding in the lower
qualities. An unskilled immigration shock may represent a
major increase in the number of the unskilled. If the range
of qualities occupied by the unskilled is small, it will take
major price increases in these quality ranges to increase
supply and to displace some of the skilled from “fringe”
qualities (around Q*). Figure 2 and Appendix A are helpful
for understanding these relationships. This result contrasts
with the general effects of population growth on housing
rents with a homogeneous population in urban economics
models (Brueckner, 1988).
A corollary to proposition 1, for any model that considers
attributes of housing other than quality (for instance, the
share of people of a particular ethnicity or national origin in
a neighborhood) and that assumes heterogeneous preferences for these attributes, is that an immigration flow that is
small in comparison with the total population (that is, with
the initial stock of housing) can have a substantial impact on
rents in the market segments where immigrants concentrate.
The second important point of this simple model is that
the long-run impact on rents needn’t be equivalent to the
short-run impact. Mobility and the existence of alternative
locations become very relevant. In fact, under the assumptions of the model, the new long-run equilibrium (where I
assume that moving costs are negligible) looks exactly like
the initial equilibrium as long as N I ⬍ N *U : rents and wages
do not change in the long run. If the marginal unskilled
person is a native, he should be indifferent between any two
locations, as in the initial equilibrium. This long-run equilibrium is achieved through the out-migration of native
unskilled persons.
The results from previous empirical literature suggest that
the sensitivity of the wages of the unskilled to incoming
U
U
(N *U ) ⫺ W M
(N *U ⫹ N I ) in the
immigration [this is W M
model] is very small. Thus, most of the short-run impact of
immigration on unskilled previous residents comes, in the
model, from changes in the prices of the dwellings that
immigrants tend to occupy. Moreover, if wages are sticky,
the dynamics toward the long-run equilibrium can, in theory, be entirely explained by short-run changes in housing
rents.
III.

FIGURE 2.—SHORT-RUN EQUILIBRIUM IN THE HOUSING MARKET
IMMIGRATION SHOCK
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The figure shows how the bid rents change in the short run after an unskilled immigration shock. The
bid rents shift upwards. Q* is the initial quality that separated the unskilled and skilled before the shock.
Q** is the new separating quality level.

statistical area (SMSA) Annual Housing Survey (AHS). The
national AHS sample surveyed some 60,000 housing units
annually between October and December. Typically, 40%
were rental units. Housing units were selected from the
decennial Census of Population and Housing to be representative of the overall U.S. housing stock. The separate
SMSA sample surveyed units in selected metropolitan areas, covering some 4,500 units in each SMSA until 1983,
when the sample size was reduced by about 20%. The
metropolitan areas were selected on a four-year rotating
basis. The Miami SMSA is included in the AHS metropolitan sample in 1979 and 1983, which provides a good
portrait of the evolution of the Miami housing market before
and after the boatlift.10 For other years I use the smaller
Miami sample from the national AHS. Unfortunately, the
other metropolitan areas covered by both the 1979 and 1983
metropolitan AHS do not make good comparison groups.
Thus, the comparison cities are from the national sample.
Typically, there are only a small number of complete observations on rents by MSA in the national sample,11 so I
pool observations from several cities to generate comparison groups. The main comparison group is formed by the
remaining Florida SMSAs included in the national AHS
(encompassing Fort Lauderdale, West Palm Beach–Boca
Raton, Tampa–Saint Petersburg, Orlando, and Jacksonville).
As the second comparison group I use a group of cities with
similar previous rent growth. The last comparison group is
formed by the rest of the metropolitan areas identified in the
national AHS.

Data

The main data source consists of observations from rental
units in the 1974–1983 national and standard metropolitan

10 The SMSA sample for Miami provides observations for 4,000 units
(about 1,600 rentals). Table 1 offers summary statistics of the data.
11 The median number of observations with rent data by MSA is 45.
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TABLE 1.—WEIGHTED AHS RENTALS SAMPLE MEANS
Annual Housing Survey Samples
Miami

Metro Florida

Similar Growth

Metro U.S.

1979

1983

1979

1983

1979

1983

1979

1983

234.381 (3.028)

354.611 (4.588)

208.919 (7.257)

308.360 (8.542)

188.664 (3.551)

271.544 (5.322)

216.428 (1.045)

317.196 (1.688)

Lives in central
city

0.314 (0.011)

0.297 (0.012)

0.174 (0.023)

0.151 (0.023)

0.378 (0.022)

0.355 (0.025)

0.441 (0.005)

0.418 (0.005)

Lives in suburbs

0.686 (0.011)

0.703 (0.012)

0.185 (0.023)

0.205 (0.023)

0.382 (0.022)

0.351 (0.025)

0.357 (0.005)

0.365 (0.005)

Central city status
unknown

0.000 (0.000)

0.000 (0.012)

0.641 (0.029)

0.644 (0.027)

0.240 (0.019)

0.294 (0.020)

0.202 (0.004)

0.217 (0.004)

1 bedroom

0.468 (0.012)

0.434 (0.013)

0.389 (0.030)

0.348 (0.027)

0.316 (0.021)

0.301 (0.020)

0.362 (0.005)

0.352 (0.005)

2 bedrooms

0.331 (0.011)

0.346 (0.012)

0.368 (0.029)

0.421 (0.028)

0.458 (0.023)

0.424 (0.022)

0.406 (0.005)

0.405 (0.005)

3 bedrooms

0.087 (0.007)

0.106 (0.008)

0.163 (0.022)

0.178 (0.021)

0.152 (0.016)

0.195 (0.017)

0.145 (0.003)

0.158 (0.004)

4 bedrooms

0.012 (0.002)

0.013 (0.003)

0.013 (0.006)

0.015 (0.007)

0.022 (0.007)

0.025 (0.007)

0.024 (0.001)

0.025 (0.001)

5 bedrooms

0.001 (0.000)

0.001 (0.001)

0.006 (0.004)

0.002 (0.002)

0.009 (0.004)

0.006 (0.003)

0.002 (0.000)

0.004 (0.001)

6 or more
bedrooms

0.000 (0.000)

0.001 (0.001)

0.000 (0.000)

0.000 (0.000)

0.000 (0.000)

0.000 (0.000)

0.000 (0.000)

0.000 (0.000)

Built before 1965

0.445 (0.012)

0.417 (0.013)

0.360 (0.030)

0.313 (0.027)

0.516 (0.023)

0.512 (0.022)

0.594 (0.005)

0.562 (0.005)

Nominal rent

Unweighted
number of
observations

1915

1562

281

317

494

525

10863

11084

Population-weighted Group Means (City-Wide Data)

Population growth (1974–1979)
Employment growth (1974–1979)
Income/capita growth (1974–1979)
Income/capita (1979)
Population (1979)

Miami

Metro Florida

Similar Growth

Metro
U.S.

1.451%
3.585%
8.202%
9,492
1,584,586

2.551%
4.887%
8.202%
9,340
1,055,418

1.282%
3.912%
8.914%
9,476
1,271,773

0.868%
3.293%
8.993%
9,944
2,755,306

All micro-sample means stand for weighted sample proportions, with the exception of nominal rent. Data for Miami from AHS SMSA samples. Data for Florida, similar previous growth group, and United States
from the AHS national sample. Other Florida data include observations from the following MSAs: Fort Lauderdale, Jacksonville, Orlando, Tampa–St. Petersburg, West Palm Beach–Boca Raton. The similar growth
group includes West Palm Beach, Tucson, South Bend, Appleton, Rochester, Atlanta, Tampa, Milwaukee, Spokane, and Greensboro. The national metro sample includes all metropolitan areas identified by the AHS.
Standard errors for the estimated means (not sample standard errors) in parentheses. “One bedroom” includes studios. Population-weighted group means use data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis on MSA-level
employment, income, and population. Income per capita growth in current dollars.

The AHS followed the same units from 1974 to 1983,
with additions of new housing and deletions because of
demolition and nonresponses. Therefore, this data set
allows for a longitudinal treatment. The AHS was not
carried out in 1982. After 1983 the national sample
reduced its periodicity to two years, starting with the
1985 sample. The sample of units changed, and it is not
possible to match the 1979 units with the observations
from the 1985 sample.
Data on the characteristics of Miami’s residents and
Florida’s residents are also extracted from the U.S. 1980 and
1990 Census Public Microdata Samples (IPUMS).
Fair market rent (FMR) data are from the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD). An individual’s
housing rent must be below the corresponding FMR in the
metropolitan statistical area (MSA) in order to be eligible
for housing subsidies from the federal government. The
FMR corresponds to the price of a vacant 2-bedroom rental
unit at the 45th percentile of the MSA’s distribution. It is
calculated annually by HUD using data from the AHS
SMSA samples, when available, combined with random
samples. The FMR can be interpreted as the price for a

rental unit of moderate quality. The Bureau of Labor Statistics provides the urban consumer price index (CPI) that I
use to deflate rents (the base is an average of prices over the
1982–1984 period).
Data on the postal codes of legal immigrants’ intended
residences are from the “Immigrants Admitted to the United
States, 1990” files, from the Immigration and Naturalization
Service. The data have several caveats worth mentioning.
First, this data source does not include the population of
illegal immigrants. Second, many foreign-born persons are
admitted into the United States some years after they have
arrived in the country as nonimmigrants. Finally, the intended residence reported by immigrants may not end up
being their final destination. These data nevertheless have
their advantages over decennial census data. They are a
reasonable indicator of recent legal immigration flows.
Census data only allow us to determine the decennial
change in the foreign-born population, and the number of
immigrants that are present in the city and that arrived in the
city within the last 5 years (for a rather restricted sample of
MSAs). There is a very strong correlation between the
change in the foreign-born by city in the decennial censuses
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TABLE 2.—IMMIGRANTS

FAIR MARKET RENTS

AND

log(Rent92) ⫺ log(Rent90)

log(Rent91)
(1)
log(income per capita)

0.536** (0.048)

log(population)

0.009

New immigrants per 100 population (1990)

0.144** (0.035)

(0.008)

(2)

log(population90) ⫺ log(population89)

R-square
N

Sample Means
(5)
9.808 (0.184)
12.800 (1.136)

0.024** (0.005)

0.023** (0.005)
⫺0.114

(1.603)

log(income90) ⫺ log(income89)

State fixed effects

(4)

(0.008)

0.144** (0.035)
⫺0.372

Housing unit permits per capita (1989)

(3)

0.538** (0.048)
0.009
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0.172 (0.217)

(0.499)

0.005 (0.005)

0.111** (0.050)

0.107** (0.050)

0.052 (0.023)

0.019

0.139

0.012 (0.016)

(0.074)

(0.124)

Yes

Yes

No

No

0.847
309

0.827
309

0.088
309

0.092
309

309

The table shows regressions of fair market rents (or changes) on immigration inflows. Standard errors of regression parameters in parentheses. The sample means are unweighted between MSAs and are meant
to provide a characterization of the sample observations. They should not be used to make inferences about the U.S. population. Sample standard errors in parentheses.

and the cumulative number of legal immigrants admitted
over a similar period.12 Finally, the data report the first time
that the immigrants entered the United States as nonimmigrants: for example, in 1990 about 70% of admitted immigrants entered the country the same year in which they were
admitted. About 90% of the immigrants admitted in 1990
report having arrived in the United States in or after 1988.
Postal codes from the “Immigrants Admitted to the
United States, 1990” files are matched to 1990 statistical
metropolitan areas using the Census MABLE geocorrelation engine. Data on the evolution of per capita area income,
employment, and population at the MSA level are obtained
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Census
Bureau.
Data on the Mariel boatlift population are obtained from
a sample of 514 refugees (Mariel Cubans in Miami, 1983–
1986; Johns Hopkins University) gathered by Alejandro
Portes. Portes randomly sampled households in census
tracts with a large share of Cuban immigrants in 1980.
The evolution of housing prices after 1982 is obtained
from the Freddie Mac repeated-sales index. This index uses
the consecutive transaction prices of a longitudinal sample
of housing units. Data on authorized housing starts at the
MSA level are from the Census Bureau’s C40 series “New
Privately Owned Housing Units Authorized.”
IV.

Background and Empirical Strategy

Recent immigrants to the United States and other countries tend to occupy rental units of relatively low quality.13
12 I run a regression of the cumulative number of immigrants into an
MSA from 1980 to 1989 (I impute the values from 1980 to 1982 with 1983
values, the first year for which the INS provides information on the ZIP
code of intended residence of immigrants). A regression of the change of
the Census’s foreign-born on the INS estimate of the cumulative number
of new immigrants yields a coefficient of 1 (t-statistic of 16), even after
controlling for population in 1980 (a general scale effect).
13 Joint Center for Housing Studies (2000). Callis (1997) uses the CPS
to estimate that in 1996 the home-ownership rate for a noncitizen who
entered the United States in 1990 or later was only 14.7%. Friedman,

Most immigrants arrive in their new country of residence
without assets that can be used as collateral to buy a house.
Some of them do not have credit records comparable to
those in the United States. Many are uncertain as to the
duration of their stay in their port of entry and are not
willing to undertake the homeownership commitment. Furthermore, the supply of housing with the characteristics
demanded by immigrants is not completely elastic in the
short run.
There is a very small literature on the impact of immigration on the evolution of rental prices. Muller and Espenshade (1985) compared the evolution of prices from 1967 to
1983 in Los Angeles, a port of entry for a large number of
immigrants, to changes in prices in the rest of the United
States. They found that “prices for medical care, rental
housing, private transportation, and fuel rose faster than
prices nationwide, and the price of rental housing was
noticeably higher.” These authors explain this pattern by
arguing that “because most immigrants live in rental units,
the rental housing market would experience substantial
pressure from the rising immigrant-induced demand.” Burnley, Murphy, and Fagan (1997) found immigration to be one
of the important correlates of changes in housing prices in
Sidney, Australia. Ley and Tuchener (1999) reported a
strong time-series correlation between housing prices and
immigration in Toronto and Vancouver, Canada. These studies are descriptive in nature. The authors do not control for
other variables that could account for changes in housing
prices, such as economic cycles.
Although suggestive, previous results cannot establish
the causal effect of immigration on rents. Many other
social and economic changes were specific to the Los
Rosenbaum, and Schill (1998) find that foreign-born households in New
York City are more likely to live in crowded and dilapidated housing units.
The fact that immigrants disproportionately consume rental units of lower
quality is also true in the European context. Thave (1999) reports that
78.75% of immigrant households in France dwelt in rental units in 1984.
The average area of an immigrant dwelling was 63 m2, compared to 83 m2
for French nationals.

508

THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS

Angeles, Sidney, Toronto, and Vancouver metropolitan
areas that could have accounted for the changes in rents
and housing prices and could be correlated with immigration.
The positive correlation between immigration and rental
prices seems pervasive, nevertheless. The first column in
Table 2 presents a reduced-form regression of the log of
1991 FMR in MSAs on other variables. In column (1) the
explanatory variables are the log of MSA population, the log
of MSA per capita income, and the number of new immigrants per 100 population in 1990. State fixed effects are
included to control for broad regional effects. Immigration
appears strongly associated with higher prices for apartments of moderate quality. It can be argued, though, that
immigration is endogenous to and captures the effect of an
omitted variable: expectations of future economic growth.14
To control for this, column (2) introduces the rate of new
housing permits per capita in 1989 as an explanatory variable. Expectations of future growth should translate into
greater building activity. The results do not change. Yet,
immigration flows might be correlated with unobservable
MSA amenities that attract immigrants and explain the
higher rents. To address this concern, columns (3) and (4)
repeat the exercise using differences in rents, income, and
population between 1990 and 1992. The change of FMR
between 1990 and 1992 seems strongly associated with the
immigration inflow in 1990. An immigration inflow that
represented 1% of the MSA initial population was associated with a 2.3% increase in rents two years later. This effect
is found despite the fact that I am controlling for income and
overall population growth.15
The results in Table 2 clearly point to immigration as one
possible explanatory factor behind rent increases for housing of moderate quality. These results, though, might be
biased. Immigration is endogenous to rental prices: at the
margin, if rents become unusually high, some immigrants
will decide to move toward less expensive locations. In
principle, this could bias the estimates downward. At the
same time, omitted variables (such as positive productivity
shocks or changes in amenities that are valuable to firms,
immigrants, and natives) could explain the changes in rental
prices and be positively correlated with immigration flows.
If the new-housing-permits variable does not capture this
effect, the omitted variable problem would bias the estimates upward.
14 Counter to that argument, note that expectations may change the asset
price of housing units but should not directly change spot-market rents. If
the population level is based on expectations, this could explain increasing
rents; but the regressions already control for this variable.
15 Notice that immigration can have an impact even if it is associated
with no population growth. With a very inelastic short-term housing
supply, we need higher rents in order to displace natives from the city that
received the immigration inflow. Net population changes may be very
small. Finding an effect of immigration even when we control for
population growth suggests that immigration inflows are more exogenous
to rent changes than are other population flows.

To assess the robustness of these findings and tackle the
possible identification problem I make use of the exogenous
immigration shock described by Card (1990). About
125,000 Cuban immigrants arrived in southern Florida between May and September 1980. The inflow responded to
an exogenous and unpredicted decision by the Cuban government to allow emigration from that country. Of these
125,000 immigrants, Card estimates that about 50% (some
62,500 people, or 3.8% with respect to Miami’s 1980
population) decided to stay in the Miami metropolitan area.
Portes and Stepick (1985) reckoned that as of 1983 only
“one third of the Mariel refugees were resettled and remain
outside the Miami SMSA.” Thus, as of 1983, the number of
Mariel immigrants in Miami had reached about 84,000
people (5.5% of Miami’s population in 1980). Mariel immigrants were relatively unskilled, in both formal education
and fluency in English (see Portes & Stepick, 1985).16
Table 3 supplies us with some data on the Miami rental
market in April 1980. The market was clearly dominated by
low-income tenants before the boatlift. Of tenants in rental
units, 72% had household incomes below the Miami median. About 40% of the Miami population lived in rental
units (646,627 people, from my tabulations of the 1980
Census). For immigrants living in the United States less
than 5 years, the proportion of renters was a much higher
70%. Indeed, most of the new Mariel immigrants were
participants in the rental market by 1983. My tabulations
from the “Mariel Cubans in Miami” sample show that 92%
of Mariel Cubans lived in rental housing (compared to
52.42% for the population living in the census tracts sampled by this study, according to the 1980 Census). Using
Card’s (1990) conservative estimate, the number of new
immigrants thus represented an exogenous increase of about
9% in the renters’ population. If we use Portes and Stepick’s
(1985) estimates, the boatlift could have increased the initial
renters’ population by 12%.
To estimate the impact of such a shock on rental prices,
I compare the evolution of rents in Miami with that of rents
in other cities before and after the shock. The identifying
assumption is that nothing else specific to Miami accounts
for any diverging trend in rental prices. The basic differencesin-differences equation that I estimate is
R it ⫽ ␣ i ⫹ ␤D after ⫹ ␥DafterDMiami ⫹ εit ,
where R it is the rent (or log rent) for unit i at year t, ␣ i is
a unit fixed effect, D after and D Miami are dummy variables
that take value 1 if t ⬎ 1980 and if the MSA is Miami,
respectively, and ε it is an error term.
It is not possible to find a perfect “twin” comparison city
for Miami. Rent levels in Miami were bound to be different
from those in other cities because of different amenities and
16 Portes and Stepick (1985) argue that only 24.8% of the Mariel entrants
had a high school degree, and only 10.6% reported speaking English well
or very well.
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TABLE 3.—THE RENTAL MARKET

IN

MIAMI (1980)

Panel A: Distribution of Renters by Income in Miami
All

Renter Distribution

Income Decile

% Renter

% Owner

Percent

Cumulative

1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
6th
7th
8th
9th
10th

73.19
62.48
50.39
56.13
41.69
34.41
28.31
20.12
14.74
10.3

26.81
37.52
49.61
43.87
58.31
65.59
71.69
79.88
85.26
89.7

19.05
15.68
14.26
12.87
10.63
8.78
7.22
5.13
3.76
2.63

19.05
34.73
48.99
61.86
72.48
81.27
88.49
93.61
97.37
100

%

All

Central City

Owner
Renter

60.22
39.78

39.4
60.6

%

All

Central City

Owner
Renter

74.32
25.68

65.53
34.47

Panel B: Miami MSA: Renters versus Owners
Hispanic
Non-Hispanic
Recent Immigrants
53.72
46.28

64.01
35.99

Panel C: Other Metro Florida
Hispanic
Non-Hispanic
69.04
30.96

30.98
69.02

Recent Immigrants

Recent Hispanic Immigrants

55.65
44.35

40.27
59.73

74.57
25.43

1,625,509
36.5

Recent Hispanic Immigrants

35.37
64.63

Panel D: Miami: Hispanic Population
MSA
Total population (1980)
Percent Hispanic

509

Central City
384,237
56.01

Data from Census Bureau 1980 5% Public Use Microdata Samples.

labor markets. The approach in this paper is to construct
three different comparison groups that are plausible a priori,
to compare the performance of the housing markets and
other economic variables prior to the boatlift, checking for
previous trends, and to assess the robustness of the findings
to the use of plausible alternative groups.
Geography is the most important determinant of rents and
housing prices. State dummies explained about 63% of the
variance of MSA median rent levels in 1990, and 68% of the
variance of the change in median rents between 1980 and
1990.17 Thus, the first of my comparison groups is the rest
of the metropolitan areas in Florida that are included in the
1979 and 1983 Annual Housing Surveys: Fort Lauderdale,
Jacksonville, Orlando, Tampa–St. Petersburg, and West
Palm Beach–Boca Raton.
The second comparison group is based on selecting
several metropolitan areas that replicate Miami’s evolution
of rents before 1979. In particular, I calculate the evolution
of median rents in the national AHS by metropolitan area
from 1975 to 1979. The similar-previous-growth comparison group is formed by ten metropolitan areas18 with the
closest median growth rate to Miami in that period: West
Palm Beach (FL), Tucson (AZ), South Bend (IN), Appleton
17 The results reflect the R-square of the following two regressions: 1990
Census median rent by MSA on state dummies; difference of the log of
median rents by MSA between 1980 and 1990 on state dummies. There
are 325 MSA observations and 51 states.
18 The results are not sensitive to reasonable changes in the number of
comparison cities.

(WI), Rochester (NY), Atlanta (GA), Tampa (FL), Milwaukee (WI), Spokane (WA), and Greensboro–Winston-Salem
(NC). Note that two of the comparison cities are also in the
comparison group in Card (1990).19
The third comparison group encompasses all of the U.S.
metropolitan areas identified in the AHS. The group is
intended to capture broad national trends in housing markets
and economic conditions, dispel potential concerns over
preselection bias, and provide a further check on the robustness of the findings. As still further checks, I will also note
that the results are very robust to the use of two other
plausible broad regional comparison groups: the SouthAtlantic Division and South Region from the Census, both
containing Florida. Figure 3 provides a picture of all these
groups.
Table 1 summarizes the previous evolution of other
key economic variables with available periodic data prior
to the boatlift: employment, population, and income
per capita. Remarkably, the similar-previous-rent-growth
group exhibited very close growth to Miami in population,
19 Unfortunately, the two other cities, Houston and Los Angeles, do not
make good comparison groups. Houston was experiencing a construction
boom at the end of the 1970s and early 1980s, driven by the contemporaneous increase in oil prices. In Los Angeles, the previous evolution of
rents was very dissimilar from Miami’s: during the previous 4-year period,
1975–1979, the growth of the CPI-deflated median rent in Los Angeles
was 10.80%, compared to ⫺9% in Miami; over that period, Los Angeles
ranked 31st out of 111 metropolitan areas in rent growth, whereas Miami
ranked 92nd.
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FIGURE 3.—THE COMPARISON GROUPS

Upper map: The states in darker color represent the South census region excluding the South-Atlantic Division. The South-Atlantic Census Division States are in medium shade. The map displays the metropolitan
areas in the similar-growth comparison group. Lower map: Miami and the Florida comparison cities in the annual housing surveys.

employment, and income per capita during 1974–1979,
but the trends for the other two groups are not dissimilar.
All in all, the three groups seem to provide reasonable
counterfactuals with regard to previous trends in economic growth.
The housing markets in the three comparison groups
chosen seem to provide good benchmarks. Figure 4 portrays
the evolution of sample mean log rents in Miami and the
comparison cities from 1974 through 1983, using the national AHS samples. Figure 5 shows the evolution of the
differential between the groups. The evolution of rents for
the Florida comparison group was similar to Miami’s from
1974 to 1979, and, obviously, so was that of the similargrowth comparison group. The comparative evolution for
Florida is bumpier, but it is hardly possible to discern any
previous upward or downward trend in the rental price
differential.
There was a clear convergence in rents between Miami
and the rest of the metropolitan United States before
1977. From 1977 to 1979 the differential seems to have
stabilized. The graph seems to preclude the possibility
that the estimates capture the effect of previous upward
trends in the Miami rent differential and introduces a
somewhat conservative bias into the quantification of an
increase due to the Mariel boatlift when using the U.S.
comparison group.

In all cases the rent differential increased sharply in 1981,
right after the boatlift. As Figure 4 indicates, the differential
was driven by a sharp increase in rents in Miami in 1981. In
fact, Miami’s real rents had been very stable during 1976–
1980. The evidence is consistent with an impact from the
Mariel boatlift. Previous trends in the evolution of rents
could not account for the increase in the differential; most of
the differential arose from a sharp increase in rents in Miami
after the boatlift. The pictures, of course, cannot be taken as
proof of the impact of the boatlift on rentals: the sample
composition may vary somewhat between SMSAs, and the
different qualities of the units could explain the price movements (due to composition effects).
The regression approach will better control for the composition of housing units in the samples and will allow us to
determine the quantitative impact and statistical significance
of the boatlift. I will also show other results consistent with
the immigration shock.
V.

Results and Discussion

A. The Price Response

To quantify the impact statistically, the paper resorts to a
differences-in-differences regression. I start by matching the
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FIGURE 4.—RENTS

IN

MIAMI

AND COMPARISON
LEVELS

CITIES (1974–1983):

FIGURE 5.—RENTS

IN
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MIAMI AND COMPARISON CITIES (1974–1983):
DIFFERENCES

rental units that appear in the 1979 and 1983 samples.20 The
differences-in-differences estimates include a unit fixed ef20

The results are robust to controlling for possible attrition bias. For
instance, it may be that the units retired from the market tend to be the
units with lower rent growth, and it may conceivably have been easier to
convert rental units into condos in the Miami area. To address this issue,
I undertook the differences-in-differences regression with all observations,
no unit fixed effects, and some controls for unit quality. The results
(available upon request) are not very different but are more imprecise. A
previous version of the paper also showed the results from Heckman-type

fect. Thus I control to a great extent for the unobserved
quality (location and structure) of the dwellings in the
sample. The regressions consider rents for rental units not in
public housing projects.
selection adjustments using the U.S. comparison group (available on
request): the results remained unchanged.
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TABLE 4.—DIFFERENCES-IN-DIFFERENCES: MIAMI
Metro Florida
(1)
Rent

1983
Miami ⫻ 1983
Constant

5.786

(2)
log(Rent)

(5.988)

VS.

COMPARISON GROUPS

Panel A: 1979–1983
Similar Previous Growth

0.035

(0.027)

(3)
Rent
3.633

Metro U.S.

(4)
log(Rent)

(5)
Rent

(6)
log(Rent)

(2.341)

0.011** (0.014)

10.869** (0.767)

0.038** (0.004)

20.677** (6.382)

0.071** (0.029)

22.830** (3.217)

0.095** (0.018)

15.593** (2.336)

0.068** (0.011)

212.929** (2.900)

5.248** (0.013)

200.314** (1.374)

5.211** (0.008)

217.586** (0.554)

5.276** (0.003)

Unit fixed effects

Yes**

Yes**

Yes**

Yes**

Yes**

Yes**

R-square
N ⫻ T

0.857
2810

0.8597
2810

0.904
3114

0.895
3114

0.9104
18518

0.8744
18518

Panel B: 1979–1981
Similar Previous Growth

Metro Florida
(1)
Rent
1981
Miami ⫻ 1981

(2)
log(Rent)

⫺2.616 (6.109)

0.010 (0.026)

(3)
Rent

Metro U.S.

(4)
log(Rent)

(5)
Rent

(6)
log(Rent)

⫺3.827 (2.604)

⫺0.024 (0.014)

⫺3.588** (0.675)

⫺0.021** (0.003)

26.131** (7.824)

0.081** (0.033)

27.343** (5.536)

0.114** (0.025)

27.206** (4.924)

0.112** (0.021)

212.894** (2.973)

5.262** (0.012)

199.146** (1.704)

5.202** (0.009)

216.898** (0.481)

5.270** (0.002)

Unit fixed effects

Yes**

Yes**

Yes**

Yes**

Yes**

Yes**

R-square
N ⫻ T

0.849
752

0.871
752

0.908
1076

0.913
1076

0.908
17388

0.899
17388

Constant

Standard errors in parentheses. Sample weights used in all regressions. In all tables, ** denotes a coefficient significant at the 5% level, * denotes a coefficient significant at the 10% level. The regressions include
housing units with observations in both the 1979 and 1983 samples. The Florida comparison group encompasses the following metropolitan areas in the national sample of the Annual Housing Surveys (1979 and
1983): Jacksonville, Fort Lauderdale, Orlando, Tampa, Saint Petersburg–Clearwater, and West Palm Beach–Boca Raton. The similar-previous-growth group is constructed by selecting the 10 metropolitan areas with
the closest median rent growth rate in the national AHS samples during 1975–1979. It encompasses: West Palm Beach (FL), Tucson (AZ), South Bend (IN), Appleton-Oshkosh-Neenah (WI), Rochester (NY), Atlanta
(GA), Tampa (FL), Milwaukee (WI), Spokane (WA), and Greensboro–Winston-Salem–High Point (NC). The metro U.S. group includes all observations from the National AHS in identified metropolitan areas.

Panel A in Table 4 shows the results of this fixed-effects
approach. I deflate rents in 1983 to their real value in 1979
dollars.21 The advantage of the 1979–1983 time frame is
that I can use observations from the SMSA AHS sample for
Miami and estimate the changes in rents in Miami with
more precision. I use the national AHS sample for the
comparison groups, for which I pool observations from the
different comparison MSAs. The first column uses real rents
as the dependent variable; the second column uses the
logarithm of real rents. The quantitative conclusion is clear:
there was a differential increase in rental prices in Miami
from 1979 to 1983 with respect to the comparison groups.
Columns 3 to 6 show that the choice of the comparison
group does not affect this conclusion. The higher rental
price differential in Miami appears to be specific to that
MSA. To interpret the results as differential percentage
21

The increase in the U.S. urban CPI between December 1979 and
December 1983 is used to deflate 1983 rents into 1979 dollars. Although
the CPI takes into account changes in housing prices, the fact that we are
dividing all of the 1983 observations by the same factor rules out any
endogeneity bias. Moreover, the evolution of the general urban CPI and
the urban CPI net of shelter is identical in this period (the increase in the
former representing 98.14% of the increase in the latter). The Miami 1983
difference results in the log specification are unchanged by this transformation. The differences-in-differences results in levels are only divided by
the inflation factor. The estimation in real terms is interesting, because it
yields the change in the prices in terms of the opportunity cost of a 1979
dollar spent on an alternative bundle of goods, including housing, in a
hypothetical U.S. urban market. The cumulative urban CPI inflation rate
between December 1979 and December 1983 was 32%.

changes, I use the logarithmic specification and the approximation to percentages supplied by Kennedy (1981). The
estimated boatlift impact represents a differential rent hike
of 7.31%, 9.99%, and 7.02% when the comparison groups
are Florida, the similar-previous-growth group, and the rest
of the metropolitan United States, respectively.22
Further evidence about the coincidence of the boatlift
with the rent hike in Miami is supplied in Panel B of Table
4. The table presents the fixed effects regressions for the
AHS national subsamples.23 Here I examine the price differential between 1979 and 1981. Because the data were
collected from October to December, the comparison gives
us a good picture of rentals right before the boatlift, while
leaving some time for annual contracts to be renegotiated
afterward. If the rent differential in 1983 was actually due to
22 The results are only slightly smaller and always statistically significant
with alternative broad regional groups: 6.3% using cities in the Southern
Census Region as a comparison group, and 5% using the South-Atlantic
Census Division.
23 Appendix B, Table B1 addresses the comparability between the
smaller national and the bigger SMSA samples of the AHS. Notice that I
am confined to using data for the national sample for the comparison
groups. Houston was also included in both the 1979 and the 1983 SMSA
samples. Although Houston does not make a good comparison group for
the Mariel quasi experiment (Houston had a housing construction boom
from 1979 to 1982), I can use Houston’s observations to check for the
comparability of the two samples. The coefficients in the fixed-effects
estimation are virtually identical. Despite the smaller size, the national
subsamples do an excellent job of identifying the price change differentials.
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TABLE 5.—PRICE CHANGES BY UNIT TYPE, 1979–1983
(MIAMI VS. METRO U.S.)
1983 Interaction with:
1st quartile ⫻ Miami

(1)
log(Rent)
0.055** (0.024)

(2)
Rent
13.648** (4.554)

2nd quartile ⫻ Miami

0.097** (0.021)

20.204** (3.980)

3rd quartile ⫻ Miami

0.076** (0.021)

15.557** (4.062)

4th quartile ⫻ Miami

0.022

1st quartile

0.193** (0.009)

33.082** (1.676)

2nd quartile

0.036** (0.008)

14.184** (1.492)

3rd quartile

0.006

4th quartile
R-square
N ⫻ T

(0.023)

7.265

(4.463)

(0.008)

9.667** (1.443)

⫺0.046** (0.008)

⫺8.757** (1.484)

0.876
18518

0.894
18518

Coefficients for interactions with 1983 dummy. Data from national AHS (United States) and SMSA
AHS (Miami). Units are matched between samples (balanced panel). Includes unit fixed effects. I
calculate the distribution of rents in each MSA. Units are classified according to their rent quartile in their
MSA in 1979 (controlling for the number of bedrooms). The regression allows for a different after (or
1983 dummy) coefficient for each of the quartiles, and for a separate Miami ⫻ after coefficient for each
of the quartiles in Miami.

the boatlift, we would expect to see part or all of this rent
effect in 1981. The shortcoming of the 1979–1981 comparison is that the sample sizes are considerably reduced. Yet,
the results strongly point in the same direction: there was a
major rent increase in the Miami MSA, whereas in the
comparison groups there were no real changes. The regressions on the log of rents suggest a slightly larger short-run
differential increase of 8.37%, 12.04%, and 11.82% in the
Miami rental prices with respect to the Florida ones, previoussimilar-growth, and U.S. comparison groups, respectively.
Thus, as expected, the boatlift had a strong initial impact on
rental prices that was only starting to be arbitraged away by
1983.24
The model introduced earlier also predicts that the price
impact of an unskilled immigration shock should be higher
for lower-quality units. To assess the impact of the boatlift
on the different value segments of the housing market, I
make use of the longitudinal nature of the 1979–1983 AHS
samples. Table 5 studies the price change by rent quartile. I
use the observations from the Miami SMSA 1979 and 1983
samples to get an accurate picture of the Miami market. The
comparison group is the rest of the metropolitan United
States.25 Within an MSA, and controlling for the number of
bedrooms in the housing unit, I rank all rental units according to their rental price in 1979. I proceed to calculate the
cutoff rent levels that define a rent quartile by MSA in 1979.
24

All the qualitative results in this section are robust to possible outliers
in the data: median regressions yield very similar results in all cases.
Results for the Southern group (10.7%) and the South Atlantic group
(11%) are also remarkably close.
25 Since I have to use observations from the National AHS for the
comparison groups, I chose the rest of the United States as the relevant
comparison group. On one hand (table 4), the results for the overall
boatlift impact are similar to those for the other comparison groups. More
importantly, only the U.S. group contains enough observations for each
rent quartile to estimate the differentials with precision.
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I then assign each unit to a quartile according to these 1979
benchmarks. The regressions show the coefficient of the
interaction of a 1983 dummy with a dummy for each
quartile on real rents and allow for a differential Miami
effect. Units that were in the first, second, and third quartiles
in 1979 were significantly affected in Miami. Such rental
units tended to cater to individuals with income below the
median. Households with income below the Miami median
were a majority in 1979 in the first three quartiles of the rent
distribution. Most households with incomes above the Miami median owned their houses rather than renting (see
table 3). Yet the share of households with incomes above the
median was 50% in the fourth rent quartile. As hypothesized, the Miami effect was not significant in these most
expensive units that catered to higher income households.
The results are broadly consistent with the hypothesis of a
disproportionate impact on housing units catering to individuals with lower incomes; notice, though, that the relation
between initial rent and the 1983 Miami differential is not
monotonic: units in quartile 1 seem to have experienced a
somewhat lower differential hike than units in quartiles 2
and 3.26
Table 6 investigates whether the Mariel immigration
shock had a concentrated impact in those areas of the city
occupied by poor Hispanic renters. One would expect the
new Cuban immigrants to have settled mainly in areas that
were affordable and predominantly Hispanic. Competition
for ethnic-specific amenities should have driven up rents in
those areas in the short run, until the marginal lower-income
Hispanic renter was indifferent between them and the rest of
the city. This is an interesting exercise, because other
hypothetical contemporaneous shocks in the Miami housing
market that could explain my previous results do not have
this implication. The AHS data do not provide any geo26 But this was not because rents increased less in Miami’s bottom
quartile than in the middle quartiles. Rather, this cheap rentals segment
saw a spectacular national increase in rents of some 15% in real terms.

TABLE 6.—RENTAL UNITS WITH RENTERS BELOW ONE-HALF MIAMI’S MEDIAN
HOUSEHOLD INCOME IN 1979: HISPANIC-OCCUPIED VS. OTHERS
(1)
Rent

(2)
log(Rent)

1983 dummy

18.056** (4.241)

0.072** (0.028)

1983 ⫻ Hispanic in 1979

12.326** (6.191)

0.082** (0.041)

187.234** (2.429)

5.131** (0.016)

Unit fixed effects

Yes**

Yes**

R-square
N ⫻ T

0.887
822

0.832
822

411
167

411
167

Constant

Units
Hispanic-occupied in 1979

Data from Miami SMSA sample. I match rental units that appear in both the 1979 and 1983 samples
and have complete information for rents and family income (balanced panel). Regressions include unit
fixed effects and are calculated using sample weights. The table focuses on units for which the surveyed
family income in 1979 was below Miami’s median (in the AHS). The estimated median family income
in the Miami MSA was $14,472 in 1979. The Hispanic dummy controls for units that were occupied by
Hispanic renters on 1979. The mean rent for Hispanic poor families was $171.27 in 1979 and $199.56
for other poor families (families with incomes below the Miami median).

514

THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
FIGURE 6.—PERSONS

PER

BEDROOM

IN

RENTAL UNITS

Hispanic renters in 1979. Some of these units may not have
been located in a predominantly Hispanic area. But the
probability that they were located in a Hispanic area is
certainly higher than for the other units.
Table 6 thus presents the differences-in-differences
estimates of the change in prices in units occupied by
poor Hispanic renters in 1979, including housing unit
fixed effects. A plausible comparison group is formed by
the units occupied in 1979 by non-Hispanic poor households (that is, by households with incomes below onehalf of Miami’s median). In the first column we can see
that rents in poor Hispanic households rose $12 more
than in poor non-Hispanic households. As shown in
column (2), this corresponds to an extra 8% over the
price paid by other poor renters. The evidence is consistent with the prior expectation that the impact of the
boatlift was strongest in poor Hispanic areas of the
Miami MSA.
B. Further Results: Densities, Supplies, and Turnover

In this section I try to explain how the market accommodated the unexpected increased demand for rental units in
the short run. Much of the adjustment right after the boatlift
occurred in terms of occupation densities.
Figure 6 shows us the trends of density in rental units
(measured in persons per bedroom in the market) in the
AHS samples from 1974 to 1983. This measure of density
takes into account both vacancy rates (which cannot be
measured independently with accuracy in the national AHS
samples) and density in occupied units. The pictures show
steadily declining densities and a nearly constant differential between Miami and the rest of Florida until 1979. In
1980 and 1981 there was a sharp increase in persons per
bedroom in the Miami sample.27 This differential had been
substantially reduced by 1983.
27 The very same exercise was conducted for densities of owneroccupied housing. There I find the steady decrease in densities before

TABLE 7.—DIFFERENCES

IN

PERSONS PER ROOM
1979–1981

IN THE

AHS SAMPLES,

Persons per Bedroom
(1)
Florida

graphical information besides central city location. Nevertheless we can again make use of the longitudinal nature of
the sample to address this question.
Let us start by considering only Miami’s rental units
occupied by households with incomes below one-half the
median household income in 1979. This is where one would
expect the immigration shock to have the strongest effect.
Among these, I identify the housing units occupied by

Miami

0.127* (0.071)

1981

0.014

Miami ⫻ 1981
Constant
R-square
N ⫻ T
(% Miami
increase)

(0.049)

(2)
Similar Growth
0.128** (0.064)
⫺0.050

(3)
Metro U.S.
0.046

(0.058)

(0.032)

0.024** (0.008)

0.189** (0.084)

0.253** (0.028)

0.179** (0.069)

1.138** (0.042)

1.137** (0.028)

1.219** (0.007)

0.0247
1041

0.0315
1532

0.001
24396

14.93%

19.99%

14.13%

The table shows the differences-in-differences regression of persons per bedroom in Miami versus
comparison groups. Persons per bedroom are obtained by dividing the total number of persons in the
apartment by the number of bedrooms. Weighted least squares; AHS sample weights used. Standard
errors clustered by unit. Includes all rental units within the specified areas.
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FIGURE 7.—NEW HOUSING PERMITS (HOUSING UNITS/POPULATION)

Table 7 shows the results of a simple differences-indifferences regression analysis to approximate the change in
densities in rental units in the Miami area between 1979 and
1981. Other variables might have longer adjustment periods. But if the unexpected population growth associated
with the boatlift was the cause of increased rents in 1981,
the density (the number of people per unit of housing space)
should be shown to have increased right after the boatlift.
The last row in table 7 offers the point estimate of the
differential percentage change in persons per room in Miami. Taking the rest of Florida as the relevant comparison
group, the estimated change in persons per available rental
bedroom is about 14%. This magnitude is comparable with
my previous discussion about the relative size of the immigration shock in the rentals market: a 7%–12% increase.
Indeed, neither 7% nor 12% can be rejected at the 5%
confidence level as the percentage change in persons per
bedroom after the boatlift. Thus, the data suggest that the
new immigrants were absorbed in the short run entirely
through higher occupation densities: lower vacancy rates
and higher densities in the units occupied by newly arrived
immigrants. These results, again, point to the importance of
the immigration shock in explaining the changes in rental
prices found in the previous section.
Figure 7 illustrates the evolution of the supply of new
housing in Miami and the comparison areas, using registered new housing start permits per capita. There was no
major supply response right after the boatlift. Just as in the
comparison cities, there was a big dip in new housing
permits after 1980, which was attributable to the economic
1979 and no change whatsoever in 1980 and 1981: the density differentials remain stable.

slowdown. In 1983, though, the new-housing-permits series
in the comparison areas went back to their pre-1981 levels
and actually surpassed them. In Miami there was some
reactivation in 1983, but new starts didn’t return to their
1979–1980 levels.
As illustrated in figure 6, occupation densities reverted
rapidly, after 1981, to pre-1980 levels. In fact, as of the end
of 1983 the vacancy rates for rental units measured from the
AHS (9.7%) were substantially higher than the initial ones
in 1979 (6.7%).28 Out-migration was the main mechanism
explaining the partial convergence of rents from 1981 to
1983, given the scarce and slow adjustment in the housing
supply in the immediate years after the boatlift.29
28 The AHS apartment vacancy rates for the metropolitan United States
(except Miami) were 5.98% in 1979 and 6.67% in 1983.
29 Table B3 in Appendix B illustrates this. The Miami metropolitan area
exhibits very low population growth rates just after the Mariel boatlift.

TABLE 8.—IMPACT

ON

(1)

All
Lowest wage quartile
2nd wage quartile
3rd wage quartile
Top wage quartile

NET WAGES

1979 Share of
Rent over
Household
Wage Income

(2)
Simulated Share
of Rent over
Household
Wage Income
after Boatlift

(3)

Difference

23.60%
52.50%
28.67%
20.00%
13.85%

25.02%
56.27%
30.96%
21.26%
14.81%

⫺1.42%
⫺3.77%
⫺2.30%
⫺1.26%
⫺0.96%

All data from 1979 SMSA AHS. The 1979 share of rent on wage income is calculated by multiplying
monthly rent payments by 12 and dividing by total household wage income (for all complete observations
of renter-occupied units). The simulated ex post share is calculated by applying the corresponding
percentage change in each unit’s rents by rent quartile (as estimated in table 5). For the results for the
different wage quartiles, I divide the valid sample (observations on rent and wage income complete) into
four groups of the same magnitude according to the level of household wage income.
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TABLE 9.—POST-BOATLIFT EVOLUTION
Panel A
Nominal House Price Appreciation
% Appreciation
1980–1983 1980–1987

Rochester, NY MSA
Orlando, FL MSA
Fort Myers–Cape Coral, FL MSA
Sarasota-Bradenton, FL MSA
Tampa–St. Petersburg–Clearwater, FL MSA
Jacksonville, FL MSA
Atlanta, GA MSA
Fort Lauderdale, FL PMSA
West Palm Beach–Boca Raton, FL MSA
Melbourne–Titusville–Palm Bay, FL MSA
Greensboro–Winston-Salem–High Point, NC MSA
Daytona Beach, FL MSA
Miami, FL PMSA
Appleton-Oshkosh-Neenah, WI MSA
Tucson, AZ MSA
Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI PMSA
Spokane, WA MSA
U.S.—Urban CPI

23.50
21.33
21.30
20.90
20.28
19.72
18.74
18.29
16.27
14.99
14.44
12.40
10.10
6.63
4.04
⫺2.14
⫺6.60

74.02
36.28
41.16
42.55
42.24
40.99
51.58
30.76
28.23
25.60
48.61
25.78
18.58
22.78
19.84
10.63
9.50

20.30

37.33

Panel B
HUD Fair Market Rent Evolution (1983–1990)
Fair rent 1983
1983
Rochester, NY MSA
Atlanta, GA MSA
Tucson, AZ MSA
Tampa–St. Petersburg–
Clearwater, FL
MSA
Spokane, WA MSA
Orlando, FL MSA
Jacksonville, FL MSA
Greensboro–WinstonSalem–High Point,
NC MSA
Fort Lauderdale, FL
PMSA
Milwaukee-Waukesha,
WI PMSA
Appleton-OshkoshNeenah, WI MSA
South Bend, IN MSA
Miami, FL PMSA
West Palm Beach–
Boca Raton, FL
MSA
U.S.—Urban CPI

1990

359
372
378

100.00
100.00
100.00

146.24
145.16
144.44

368
350
407
374

100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00

133.15
124.29
123.59
121.93

325

100.00

120.92

491

100.00

120.77

390

100.00

120.51

333
346
494

100.00
100.00
100.00

118.92
115.90
114.98

449

100.00

113.59

100.00

129.10

Data from Freddie Mac and HUD. Housing price changes are from the third quarter in 1980 to the third
quarter in 1983 and 1987.

income, as reported in the AHS. The second column applies
the estimated impact of the boatlift to the full distribution of
rents in 1979 and recalculates the median share of rental
expenditures as a share of wage income. In the first row, in
line with the results in table 4 (panel A), I use a 7% increase
for all rents. Column (3) of table 8 shows the percentage
impact on net wages (defined as wages minus rents), under
the assumption of no changes in the consumption of housing
services. The overall impact was small: a 1.42% reduction
in net wages. It is interesting to express this magnitude as an
elasticity with respect to the percentage change in population associated with the immigration shock. As detailed
earlier, estimates on the impact of the boatlift on Miami’s
population range from 3.8% to 5.2%. Thus, according to the
results in this paper, an unexpected immigration shock that
amounts to 1% of the city’s population can be associated
with a 0.27%–0.37% reduction in average net wages in the
short run.
The results become somewhat more interesting if we
allow for heterogeneity. Rows 2 to 5 present the results for
each of the four quartiles in the wage distribution. I also
allow for heterogeneity in the boatlift’s impact on rents: for
each unit I apply the percentage rent increase that corresponds to that housing unit’s rent quartile (table 5). I then
divide the sample into four quartiles according to reported
household wage income, conditional on being a renter. The
table reports the median share of rents over wages within
each quartile before the boatlift and the simulated share
afterward. The wage impact of the boatlift was somewhat
more substantial for renters in the lower wage quartile:
3.77% (an implied elasticity with respect to percentage
change in population of 0.72–1). Most of the difference in
the impact is due to the initial higher share of rents over
wages for these households. The smallest impact corresponds to households in the top wage quartile: 0.96 percent
(an elasticity of 0.18–0.25).
D. Housing Prices and Rents: Solving an Apparent
Paradox

While rents increased after the Mariel immigration shock,
relative housing prices collapsed in Miami. The first column
in panel A of table 9 illustrates this. The table shows the
evolution of the Freddie Mac housing price index for
TABLE 10.—SHIFTS

C. Rents and Real Wages

How substantive were the changes in rents that this paper
documents compared with the wage income of previous
residents in the Miami area? Table 8 addresses this question
for the subsample of renters in the 1979 Miami metropolitan
sample. The first column in table 8 presents the median30
share of rental expenditures over total household wage
30 Several observations report housing costs greater than their total
family wages. The median is robust to these outlying observations.

IN

DEMAND

FOR

QUALITY

Vacancy Rate
1979

1983

Rent
Quartile

Miami

Metro U.S.

Miami

Metro U.S.

1st

0.111 (0.014)

0.051 (0.004)

0.054 (0.010)

0.047 (0.003)

2nd

0.054 (0.010)

0.047 (0.003)

0.089 (0.015)

0.060 (0.004)

3rd

0.040 (0.008)

0.060 (0.004)

0.108 (0.017)

0.066 (0.004)

4th

0.061 (0.012)

0.073 (0.004)

0.138 (0.017)

0.063 (0.004)

Vacancy rates for rental housing units. Data from Miami 1979 and 1983 SMSA AHS.
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IN
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ETHNIC COMPOSITION

1979

1983

1979

1983

(1)
Owner-Occupied

(2)
Rental Units

(3)
All

(4)
OwnerOccupied

(5)
Rental Units

(6)
All

(7)
Matched
Rentals

(8)
Matched
Rentals

Hispanic

0.216 (0.008)

0.327 (0.011)

0.264 (0.007)

0.252 (0.010)

0.389 (0.012)

0.311 (0.008)

0.324 (0.012)

0.359 (0.013)

Black (nonHispanic)

0.093 (0.006)

0.174 (0.009)

0.128 (0.005)

0.105 (0.007)

0.179 (0.010)

0.137 (0.006)

0.183 (0.010)

0.199 (0.011)

White (nonHispanic)

0.544 (0.010)

0.425 (0.012)

0.493 (0.008)

0.462 (0.012)

0.328 (0.012)

0.405 (0.008)

0.416 (0.013)

0.314 (0.013)

Other

0.006 (0.001)

0.008 (0.002)

0.007 (0.001)

0.005 (0.002)

0.010 (0.002)

0.006 (0.001)

0.009 (0.007)

0.008 (0.002)

Vacant/out of
the market

0.142 (0.007)

0.067 (0.006)

0.110 (0.005)

0.176 (0.009)

0.097 (0.008)

0.142 (0.006)

0.068 (0.012)

0.121 (0.009)

3523

2052

5575

2541

1717

4258

1592

1592

Household
Head Group

N

Standard errors of the estimated means in parenthesis. Means and s.e. estimated using sample weights. Data from Miami SMSA AHS sample: 1979 and 1983. The “matched rentals” sample corresponds to the
units sampled both in 1979 and 1983.

Miami, available comparison cities, and available other
MSAs in Florida. Miami has one of the lowest housing price
appreciations between the third quarter of 1980 and the third
quarter of 1983. Changes in housing prices in Dade County
were 10 percentage points lower than the increase in the
U.S. urban CPI during the same period. A striking contrast
is offered by the changes in prices in the Fort Lauderdale
MSA, just 35 miles north of Miami, which mimic general
price level increases. How can we reconcile the apparent
paradox of rapid rent hikes and housing price devaluation?
Housing prices capitalize the present value of future rents.
Despite the short-run pressures on the rental market, participants in the housing market must have been expecting
reduced future demand (because of native out-migration and
reduced in-migration) to outweigh the demand induced by
the immigration shock. Indeed, population growth rates in
Miami after the boatlift were relatively low (see appendix B,
table B3). Card (1990) points out that “the Mariels may
have displaced other migrants from within the United States
who could have been expected to move to Miami.”
The theoretical model in the paper predicts that the
increase in rents (or the negative impact on wages) caused
by an unskilled immigration shock will eventually be exactly offset by out-migration of unskilled natives. In the
short run, welfare is reduced, but in the long run, the welfare
impact is negligible (the national long-run housing supply is
assumed to be completely elastic). Thus, ceteris paribus,
there is no reason to expect higher or lower rents in the long
run from an immigration shock as long as there are marginal
mobile natives. Housing values should not change much,
even in the short run. Even if the Mariel immigrants displaced unskilled natives because of competition in the labor
and housing markets, there seems to be no reason to expect
lower long-run population growth rates and lower house
values.
These facts suggest that something besides rental prices
and wages was important in explaining the actual and
expected population turnover. Indeed, Table 10 shows the

shift in the demand for housing quality. I consider rental
units by quartile in the rent distribution. The first quartile
corresponds to those apartments with lowest rental prices. I
compare vacancy rates in Miami and the rest of the metropolitan United States in 1979 and 1983. Vacancies in lowend units decreased dramatically in Miami, whereas the
vacancy rate for higher-quality units increased. These
changes contrast with relatively stable profiles in the rest of
the United States. The data clearly reflect the demand shift
in the lower quality segment, as hypothesized, but also
indicate decreased demand for higher qualities. Demand for
housing quality is a good proxy for permanent income. The
moving costs of persons living in rental units are smaller
than those for homeowners. The data, therefore, are consistent with the idea that wealthy persons were starting to
move out of the Miami metropolitan area in 1983.
Table 11 explores the population turnover in terms of
ethnic characteristics. There was a remarkable shift, especially in the rental market. In particular there was an
increase in the proportion of Hispanic renter-occupied units
and vacancies stemming from the out-migration of white
non-Hispanic renters. The number of rental units for which
the household head was Hispanic increased by 6.2 percentage points between 1979 and 1983. The number of vacant
units increased by 3 percentage points. Remarkably, the
number of units with a white Anglo head of household
decreased a full 9.7 percentage points in only these four
years. Notice that this pattern was not a consequence of
Hispanics moving into newly built units but represented a
real turnover. In columns (7) and (8) I present the ethnic
composition of head of household for apartments that were
rented in 1979 and that appear again in the 1983 sample: the
reader is looking at data for the very same dwellings.
This evidence is consistent with a perception of the
Mariel immigration shock as a negative amenity by higher
income and predominantly white previous residents. Contemporary accounts from the Miami and national press
could have helped to associate the Mariel refugees with
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crime and other social problems. A good portrait of the
ethnic tensions in Miami created by the big inflows of
immigrant population, especially the Mariel boatlift, can be
found in Grenier and Stepick (1992) and Portes and Stepick
(1993). The Washington Post (1998) and US News (1996)
provide anecdotal views on what they denominate the
“white flight” from the Miami MSA.
The evidence from the Miami case is also consistent with
Filer’s (1992) study. This author reports that “white native
workers are less likely than other ethnic groups to find the
cities where the immigrants settle attractive.” In the long
run, then, immigration may interact with existing ethnic
residential preferences (Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor, 1999).
Although the evidence is consistent with a story in which
the Mariel immigrants were perceived as a negative amenity
by some existing residents, more work is needed to study
the relationship between immigration and the demand for
residential segregation.
In areas and events in which high-income residents perceive low-skilled immigration inflows as a negative amenity, the demand for higher-quality units will decrease in the
long run. The existence of vacant units of higher quality will
put downward pressure on the prices of all housing units.
The filtering down of higher-quality housing to the poor
(O’Flaherty, 1993) will accelerate. Some unskilled persons,
including immigrants, will occupy housing units of higher
quality. In the long run, this may imply lower rents for all
units, including lower-quality homes. Indeed, rent growth in
Miami from 1983 to 1990, as measured by the FMR,31 was
slower than in the comparison groups.
In the short run, therefore, immigration shocks put pressure on local housing markets and rents are pushed up. The
longer-run effect of immigration on rents and prices, as the
Miami case suggests, may depend on whether immigration
is perceived as a negative amenity by previous residents.
The interaction between immigration and preferences for
residential segregation cannot be identified by means of the
methodology used in this paper. Clearly, this is an important
question that requires further research.
VI.

Conclusions

This paper identifies the short-run impact of immigration
on local housing. Recent immigrants tend to demand lowerquality rental housing and are willing to bid out natives for
these kinds of dwellings in the port-of-entry metropolitan
areas.
I find that the level of immigration in U.S. metropolitan
areas in 1990 was correlated with increases in rents for
dwellings of moderate quality between 1990 and 1992.
To address concerns over the endogeneity of immigration
inflows, and following the approach in Card (1990), I make
31 Unreported analysis of the 1986 AHS also shows that by 1986 all of
Miami’s 1979–1983 differential growth was completely depleted, and
there was actually a reverse differential in favor of the comparison groups.

use of the Mariel boatlift, which increased the renter population in Miami by about 9% in only one year. The Mariel
boatlift immigration shock increased rental prices in the
Miami area by 8% to 11% between 1979 and 1981. This
differential was still 7% in 1983. The quantitative adjustment in the short run was mainly achieved with higher
residential densities in the rental market. Units that were
occupied by poor Hispanic renters in 1979 may have experienced higher rent hikes. Units in the highest quartile in the
1979 Miami rent distribution were not affected by the rent
hikes.
Even in the absence of a reduction in nominal wages, the
rent hike decreased real wages. The results may contribute
to an explanation of the moving decisions of marginal
native workers in the short to medium run, although the
impact on real wages was modest. My estimates of the wage
impact range from 1% for persons in the upper quartile of
the renters’ wage distribution to 3.8% for persons in the
lowest quartile. The results qualify the findings of the labor
economics literature on the local impact of immigration in
the short run. Unpredicted immigration inflows do change
local real wages in the very short run.
In the absence of further immigration, the long-run evolution of rents and housing prices depends on whether
immigrants are perceived as a negative amenity. This might
have been the case in Miami after the Mariel boatlift.
Relative housing prices, which capitalize future changes in
rents, moved in the opposite direction from rents, even in
the short run. There was a remarkable change in the ethnic
composition of the city’s dwellers in only 4 years.
These results suggest several avenues for future research
on this topic. To understand the longer-run impact of sustained immigration on housing markets, future work should
be devoted to studying whether the qualitative and quantitative results in this paper are generalizable to other metropolitan areas and time periods and whether sustained, expected immigration inflows have similar effects.32 It would
also be relevant to learn more about the response of housing
supply. It is particularly important to examine whether
supply responds to sustained unskilled immigration inflows
by, for instance, shifting construction toward multiunit
dwellings. Finally, it seems important to understand what is
the amenity value of immigration for previous residents in
general. Miami’s experience around 1980 might be special,
and the methodology used in this paper constrains the
validity of the results to the short run. Nevertheless, the
Miami case study suggests that labor and housing markets
are not the only factor behind the moving decisions of
natives in the long run. Social interactions are clearly
important, and housing markets give us information about
their value.
32

An effort in that direction can be found in Saiz (2002).

ROOM IN THE KITCHEN FOR THE MELTING POT: IMMIGRATION AND RENTAL PRICES
References
Altonji, Joseph, and David Card, “The Effects of Immigration on the
Labor Market Outcomes of Natives,” in John M. Abowd and
Richard Freeman (Eds.), Immigration, Trade, and the Labor Market (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991).
Blanchard, Olivier J., and Lawrence Katz, “Regional Evolutions,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 0:1 (1992), 1–61.
Borjas, George, “The Economics of Immigration,” Journal of Economic
Literature 32:4 (1994), 1667–1717.
Heaven’s Door: Immigration Policy and the American Economy
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
“Does Immigration Grease the Wheels of the Labor Market?”
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2001:1 (2001).
Borjas, George, and Lynette Hilton, “Immigration and the Welfare State:
Immigrant Participation in Means-Tested Entitlement Programs,”
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 111:2 (1996), 575–604.
Borjas, George, Richard Freeman, and Lawrence Katz, “Searching for the
Effect of Immigration on the Labor Market,” The American Economic Review 86:2 (1996), 246–251.
Braid, Ralph M., “The Short Run Comparative Statics of a Rental Housing
Market,” Journal of Urban Economics 10 (1981), 286–310.
Brueckner, Jan K., “The Structure of Urban Equilibria: A Unified Treatment of the Alonso-Muth-Mills Model,” (pp. 821–845), in E. S.
Mills (Ed.), Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics 2 (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1988).
Burnley, Ian, Peter Murphy, and Robert Fagan, Immigration and Australian Cities (Sydney: The Federation Press Ltd., 1997).
Callis, Richard, “Moving to America—Moving to Homeownership,” Current Housing Reports H121/97-2 (Census Bureau, 1997).
Card, David, “The Impact of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami Labor
Market,” Industrial & Labor Relations Review 43:2 (1990), 245–
257.
Cutler, David M., Edward L. Glaeser, and Jacob Vigdor, “The Rise and
Decline of the American Ghetto,” Journal of Political Economy
107:3 (1999), 455–506.
Filer, Randall K., “Immigrant Arrivals and the Migratory Patterns of
Native Workers,” in George J. Borjas and Richard B. Freeman
(Eds.), Immigration and the Workforce (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1992).
Friedman, Samantha, Emily Rosenbaum, and Michael Schill, “The Housing Conditions of Immigrants in New York City,” Fannie Mae
working paper, Fannie Mae Foundation (1998).
Grenier, Guillermo, and Alex Stepick, Miami Now!: Immigration, Ethnicity, and Social Change (University Press of Florida, 1992).
Hansen, Jorgen, and Magnus Lofstrom, “Immigrant Assimilation and
Welfare Participation: Do Immigrants Assimilate Into or Out of
Welfare?” CEPR discussion paper no. 2430 (2000).
Hoxby, Caroline, “Do Immigrants Crowd Disadvantaged American Natives Out of Higher Education?” in Daniel S. Hammermesh and
Frank D. Bean (Eds.), Help or Hindrance: The Economic Implications of Immigration for African Americans (New York: Russel
Sage Foundation, 1998).
Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, The State of the
Nation’s Housing 2000 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University,
2000).
Jones-Correa, Michael, “Immigrants, Blacks and Cities,” in Y. AlexAssensoh and L. Hanks (Eds.), Black Politics in America (New
York: New York University Press, 2000).
Kennedy, Peter E., “Estimation with Correctly Interpreted Dummy Variables in Semilogarithmic Equations,” American Economic Review
71:4 (1981), 801.
Ley, David, and Judith Tuchener, “Immigration and Metropolitan House
Prices in Canada,” Research on Immigration and Integration in the
Metropolis (Vancouver Center of Excellence) working paper no.
99-09 (1999).
Muller, Thomas, and Thomas J. Espenshade, The Fourth Wave: California’s Newest Immigrants (Washington: The Urban Institute Press,
1985).
National Research Council, The New Americans: Economic, Demographic and Fiscal Effects of Immigration (Washington: National
Academy Press, 1997).
O’Flaherty, Brendan, “An Economic Theory of Homelessness and Housing,” Journal of Housing Economics 4 (1993), 13–49.

519

Making Room: The Economics of Homelessness (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1996).
Portes, Alejandro, and Alex Stepick, “Unwelcome Immigrants: The Labor
Market Experiences of 1980 (Mariel) Cuban and Haitian Refugees
in South Florida,” American Sociological Review 4:4 (1985),
493–514.
City on the Edge: The Transformation of Miami (University of
California Press, London, 1993).
Roback, Jennifer, “Wages, Rents, and the Quality of Life,” Journal of
Political Economy 90:6 (1982).
Saiz, Albert, “The Impact of Immigration on American Cities,” Ph.D.
thesis, Harvard University (2002).
Simon, Julian L., The Economic Consequences of Immigration (Ann
Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1999).
Sweeny, James L., “Quality, Commodity Hierarchies, and Housing Markets,” Econometrica 42:1 (1974), 47–168.
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Appendix A
Recall the equations defining the housing market equilibrium:
S
U
⫺ U S ⫽ V U 共Q*兲 ⫹ A M ⫹ W M
共N *U 兲 ⫺ U U ,
V S 共Q*兲 ⫹ A M ⫹ W M

N *U ⫽

冕

(4)

Q*

S共 U 共Q兲, Q兲 dQ.

(5)

0

The parameter of interest is W MS. Introducing the price equation (the bid
rent for the unskilled) in equation (5), we have
N *U ⫽

冕

Q*
U
S共V U 共Q兲 ⫹ A M ⫹ W M
共N *U 兲 ⫺ U U , Q兲 dQ.

(A1)

0

Similarly, we can obtain the number of skilled individuals in equilibrium:
N *S ⫽

冕


Q
S
S共V S 共Q兲 ⫹ A M ⫹ W M
⫺ U S , Q兲 dQ.

(A2)

Q*

In equilibrium we obtain N *U as a function of Q*. Differentiating equation
(A1) with respect to Q* yields
N *U ⬘共Q*兲 ⫽ S共 U 共Q*兲, Q*兲

冕

Q*

⫹

U
S1 共U 共Q兲, Q兲WM
⬘共N*U 兲 N*U ⬘共Q*兲 dQ.

(A3)

0

We can rearrange this to obtain
N *U ⬘共Q*兲 ⫽

S共 U 共Q*兲, Q*兲
.
U
1 ⫺ 关W ⬘共N *U 兲 兰 Q*
0 S 1 共 共Q兲, Q兲 dQ兴
U
M

(A4)

If population does not affect wages, then when the equilibrium Q*
increases, the increase of unskilled population is equal to the number of
housing units of quality Q* in the old equilibrium. If there are wage
effects (so that the bidding curve for the poor is differentially reduced), a
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reduction in the supply for all qualities up to Q* dampens the unskilled
population increase.
Differentiating the equation (4), Q* being a function of W MS in equilibrium, yields

⫹ W ⬘共N*U 兲 䡠 N*U ⬘共Q*兲 䡠 Q*⬘共W 兲.
U
M

关S共 S 共Q兲 ⫹ C S , Q兲 ⫺ S共 S 共Q兲, Q兲兴

Q**

冕

1
⬍ 0.
U
V U⬘共Q*兲 ⫺ V S⬘共Q*兲 ⫹ W M
⬘共N *U兲 䡠 N *U⬘共Q*兲

(A6)

N I ⫹ N *U ⫽

Proof. The unskilled population competes for better qualities. In equilibrium all have to be indifferent between locations. The bid curve is
determined by the native population (immigrants do not need to bid higher
 . Let  i (Q) be the new rent bid for
than natives). Call their utility level U
U
2
group i. We need to have
U

V U 共Q兲 ⫹ A M ⫹ W M
共N *U ⫹ N I 兲 ⫺  U2 共Q兲 ⫽ U
U

(A7)

and thus
U
U ,
共N *U ⫹ N I 兲 ⫺ U
 U2 共Q兲 ⫽ V U 共Q兲 ⫹ A M ⫹ W M

(A8)

U
U
 U2 共Q兲 ⫽ V U 共Q兲 ⫹ A M ⫹ W M
共N *U 兲 ⫹ U U ⫹ 兵W M
共N *U ⫹ N I 兲

(A9)

(A10)

NI ⫽

冕

Proof. The number of skilled does not change in the short run, and we
have
S共 共Q兲, Q兲 dQ.
S

(A11)

Q*

0

关S共 S 共Q兲 ⫹ C S , Q兲 ⫺ S共 S 共Q兲, Q兲兴 dQ

⫺

冕

Q*

S共U 共Q兲, Q兲 dQ.

(A15)

Q**

Because C U ⬍ 0, we have [S( U (Q) ⫹ C U , Q) ⫺ S( U (Q), Q)] ⬍ 0
Q*
and 兰 Q**
S( U (Q), Q) dQ ⬎ 0, implying that N I ⬍ 0, which contradicts
our assumption of a positive immigration shock.
Lemma 4. C S ⬎ 0.
Proof. Assume that C S ⬍ 0. By Lemma 2, Q** ⬍ Q*. By Lemma 3,
C U ⬎ 0. The quality cutoff level that separates the unskilled from the
skilled (Q**) is such that
(A16)

(A17)

It is clear that C U ⫺ C S ⬎ 0, but, as we assumed dV S (Q)/dQ ⬎
dV U (Q)/dQ @Q, we have

Lemma 5. If C S ⬎ 0, then Q** ⬎ Q*.

Lemma 6. C U ⬎ 0.
Proof. Assume C U ⬍ 0. By Lemma 4, C S ⬎ 0 and by Lemma 5, Q**
⬎ Q*. Notice that we have
关V U 共Q*兲 ⫺ V U 共Q**兲兴 ⫺ 关V S 共Q*兲 ⫺ V S 共Q**兲兴 ⬎ 0.


Q

Q**

关S共 U 共Q兲 ⫹ C U , Q兲 ⫺ S共 U 共Q兲, Q兲兴 dQ

Proof. Similar to Lemma 2.


Q

Assume, towards a contradiction, that C S ⬍ 0 and Q** ⬎ Q*. From
equation (A11),

冕

Q**

关V U 共Q*兲 ⫺ V U 共Q**兲兴 ⫺ 关V S 共Q*兲 ⫺ V S 共Q**兲兴 ⬍ 0.

Lemma 2. If C S ⬍ 0, then Q** ⬍ Q*.

冕

(A14)

Using lemma 2 and equation (5), we obtain

关V U 共Q*兲 ⫺ V U 共Q**兲兴 ⫺ 关V S 共Q*兲 ⫺ V S 共Q**兲兴 ⫽ C U ⫺ C S .

 S2 共Q兲 ⫽  S 共Q兲 ⫹ C S .

S共 共Q兲 ⫹ C , Q兲 dQ ⫽

S共 U 共Q兲 ⫹ C U , Q兲 dQ.

Using equations (1) and (3) to substitute for the old price schedules at
Q**, subtracting equation (4), and manipulating yields

Similarly we can obtain

S

Q**

 S 共Q**兲 ⫹ C S ⫽  U 共Q**兲 ⫹ C U .

U
U ⫺ WM
共N*P 兲 ⫺ UU 其 ⬅ U 共Q兲 ⫹ CU .
⫺U


Q

冕

0

⫺

Q**

(A13)

Proof. Assume C S ⬍ 0 and C U ⬍ 0. The unskilled population is equal
to N I ⫹ N *U , and we need

Lemma 1. The new bid curves will equal the old ones plus a constant.

冕

S共S 共Q兲, Q兲 dQ ⬍ 0.

Lemma 3. If C S ⬍ 0, then C U ⬎ 0.

Thus, an increase in the skilled wage in location M reduces the quality
cutoff level for which the skilled outbid the unskilled (gentrification). All
the prices increase, and the unskilled are not displaced one for one,
because a lower unskilled population increases wages, allowing this group
to bid higher and to increase supply for the lowest qualities.
Now consider an immigration shock of N I unskilled persons. In the
short run mobility costs are arbitrarily high. In the short-run equilibrium
the dwelling supply needs to adjust in order to house the native and the
immigrant populations.

S

Q**

Q*

(A5)

Rearranging, we have
U
Q*⬘共WM
兲⫽


Q

⫺

U
S
兲
兲 ⫹ 1 ⫽ V U ⬘共Q*兲 䡠 Q*⬘共W M
V S ⬘共Q*兲 䡠 Q*⬘共W M
U
M

冕

冕

But C U ⫺ C S ⬍ 0, which contradicts equation (A17).

Q**

S共S 共Q兲, Q兲 dQ ⫽ 0.

(A12)

Proposition. C U ⬎ C S (the price increase is higher for the unskilled
individuals).

Q*

Because C S ⬍ 0, we have [S( S (Q) ⫹ C S , Q) ⫺ S( S (Q), Q)] ⬍ 0 @Q.
Q**
Also 兰 Q*
S( S (Q), Q) dQ ⬎ 0. Then

Proof. By previous lemmas, C U , C S ⬎ 0 and Q* ⬍ Q**, so
C U ⫺ C S ⫽ 关V U 共Q*兲 ⫺ V U 共Q**兲兴 ⫺ 关V S 共Q*兲 ⫺ V S 共Q**兲兴 ⬎ 0.
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Appendix B
TABLE B1.—DIFFERENCES-IN-DIFFERENCES: MIAMI

VS.

HOUSTON (1979–1983)

SMSA AHS Samples
(1)
Rent
1983

0.059

Miami ⫻ 1983
Constant

National AHS Samples
(2)
log(Rent)

(1.991)

0.006

(3)
Rent
⫺2.810

(0.011)

(4)
log(Rent)

(6.115)

0.002

(0.029)

25.154** (2.969)

0.090** (0.015)

27.339** (7.877)

0.087** (0.038)

232.226** (1.125)

5.359** (0.007)

242.314** (2.964)

5.389** (0.014)

Yes**
0.883
4772

Yes**
0.8916
4772

Yes**
0.8873
690

Yes**
0.8567
690

Fixed effects
R-square
N

Standard errors in parentheses. Sample weights used in all regressions.

TABLE B2.—EVOLUTION

OF

REAL INCOME

PER

CAPITA GROWTH RATES

MIAMI, THE UNITED STATES,

IN

AND THE

REST

OF

FLORIDA

Growth Rate (%/yr.)
1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

Annualized
1977–1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

Annualized
1983–1987

1.59
2.93
1.70
1.69
4.83
4.89
4.28

4.74
3.87
2.62
5.64
5.61
4.79
7.02

⫺0.36
⫺0.09
⫺1.13
0.06
1.30
0.67
2.24

⫺2.27
⫺2.77
⫺2.07
0.80
0.53
0.41
1.08

⫺1.82
0.40
1.46
0.22
1.65
1.51
4.05

⫺1.43
⫺0.98
1.08
0.80
⫺3.01
⫺0.60
⫺1.88

2.42
2.19
3.53
3.97
3.25
3.86
7.20

0.38
0.77
1.01
1.87
1.99
2.20
3.38

2.69
5.29
5.05
2.90
4.33
3.89
4.16

1.69
2.53
3.18
3.20
2.03
2.34
4.92

1.88
2.92
3.07
3.29
3.38
3.11
3.35

2.74
1.84
2.23
1.41
2.21
0.85
4.19

1.86
3.94
3.19
2.91
3.09
2.47
3.31

Miami
United States
Jacksonville
Orlando
Fort Lauderdale
Tampa–St. Petersburg
West Palm Beach–Boca Raton

Data in 1982–1984 average dollars using the BLS urban CPI index. Nominal MSA income per capita data from the BEA.

TABLE B3.—EVOLUTION

OF

POPULATION GROWTH

IN

MIAMI, THE UNITED STATES,

AND THE

REST

OF

FLORIDA

Growth Rate (%/yr.)

United States
Jacksonville
Miami
Fort Lauderdale
Tampa–St. Petersburg–Clearwater
Orlando
West Palm Beach–Boca Raton

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

Annualized
1977–1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

Annualized
1983–1987

1.06
1.50
0.73
3.92
2.67
3.23
3.70

1.11
0.79
2.76
4.65
3.66
4.25
6.28

1.18
2.73
2.58
4.02
3.41
4.14
6.32

0.99
1.88
5.22
2.85
3.10
3.97
5.95

0.96
1.73
0.98
2.03
2.70
3.77
4.08

0.92
1.94
0.98
1.70
3.00
4.43
3.34

0.87
2.71
0.66
1.44
2.90
4.52
3.96

1.01
1.89
1.98
2.94
3.06
4.04
4.80

0.87
2.71
0.66
1.44
2.90
4.52
3.96

0.89
2.97
1.21
1.99
2.81
4.04
4.20

0.93
3.09
1.38
1.90
2.48
4.23
4.20

0.90
2.54
1.66
2.29
2.27
4.21
4.18

1.38
2.46
1.15
1.91
2.27
4.02
3.29

Data from Census County Population estimates (Miami–Dade County) and the BEA (rest of metropolitan areas).

